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Feature: An Economic
Perspective on Basic Rights
The Costs of Enforcing Legal Rights
Richard A. Posner
I am not an expert on the formerly communist
states of Central and Eastern Europe. What I bring
to this conference is a theoretical model (cost-bene-
fit analysis) of general applicability to problems in
social ordering, some knowledge of the history and
practice of rights enforcement in the Anglo-
American legal culture, and my experience as a fed-
eraljudge involved in such enforcement.
The organizers of this conference asked the
participants to concentrate on five specific rights,
and I will discuss each of these but only after dis-
cussing the general issue of rights and their
enforcement. I will not discuss the bearing of the
European convention on human rights, which, I
understand, nations must sign, submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court of human rights in
Strasbourg, in order to be accepted as members of
the European Union.
I. I take "right" to mean simply a claim or entitle-
ment normally enforceable through courts or equiv-
alent agencies; and I assume-more controversially,
but consistently with taking an economic approach
to the issue-that rights are instruments for promot-
ing social welfare rather than things of value in
themselves. This is not to deny the existence of
moral rights', or even to treat them, in defiance as it
were of Kant, as mere instruments. It is obvious that
the law does not enforce all moral rights, but only a
subset; and the selection of the subset is decisively
influenced by instrumental considerations.
Isaiah Berlin distinguished in a famous essay
between positive and negative liberties. I offer a ver-
sion of that distinction to help frame my analysis. A
positive liberty is a right to demand a service from the
government. A negative liberty is a right not to be
interfered with by the government, or, more broadly,
by anyone. Positive liberties are associated with the
modern welfare state, negative liberties-most com-
pendiously expressed in Brandeis's famous phrase as
"the right to be let alone-with classical liberalism.
Negative liberties are less of a burden on the public
fisc. Indeed they are often assumed, especially in the-
oretical analyses, to be costless, unless one is dis-
cussing national defense. Consider the basic right of
property: if I own a good, say my automobile, you
(private person or government official) cannot take it
without my consent. To make my property right
meaningful, about all that is-or at least that seems-
necessary is a simple registration system for automo-
bile titles, a criminal penalty severe enough to deter
theft, and appropriate remedies against governmen-
tal takings. Not only do the costs of negative liberties
seem slight, but the benefits are immense, rights
being the cornerstone of a system of free markets and
democratic political governance. Positive liberties are
more costly, and their benefits often elusive. Many
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positive liberties, such as financial assistance to the
poor, public education, and publicly subsidized
health care, are largely redistributive in purpose and
effect rather than directly productive of valuable out-
put2 and they may affect incentives in a way that
reduces productivity.
But on further reflection the distinction between
negative and positive liberties blurs. Every negative
liberty, especially when the term is understood to
include liberty from private as well as public aggres-
sion or expropriation, can be seen to imply a corre-
sponding positive liberty. The rights of property and
of personal safety, which are negative liberties
enforced by criminal and tort laws, imply a public
machinery of rights protection and enforcement, a
machinery that includes police, prosecutors, judges,
and even publicly employed or subsidized lawyers for
criminal defendants who cannot afford to hire their
own lawyer. This implied right to government pro-
tection may or may not be legally enforceable (usual-
ly not, because it would require budgetary and admin-
istrative decisions that courts are poorly equipped to
make), but without it the negative liberties may be
largely ineffectual It is true that much rights protec-
tion and enforcement is carried on privately rather
than publicly; the role of arbitrators, mediators, and
private lawyers and police is particularly important.
But, with all due respect for the ingenious and force-
fully articulated views of 'anarcho-capitalists" such as
David Friedman, it is difficult to believe that the neg-
ative liberties could be made meaningful without
intervention by the public sector.
The costs of the positive liberties have been stud-
ied extensively, but little is known about the costs of
protecting and enforcing negative liberties in any
society. The reasons for this ignorance are numerous:
First, the costs of law enforcement, adjudication,
and the private legal profession are not broken down
in existing sources of data according to the rights
enforced. For example, today in the United States a
large part-but no one is sure how large a part-of the
total resources devoted to criminal law enforcement
is aimed at suppressing the traffic in illegal drugs; and
this suppression makes no obvious contribution to
securing the negative liberties. Even in principle, it is
difficult to allocate the costs of law enforcement
across rights enforced, because many of their costs are
joint; the same judges, police, prosecutors, and pri-
vate lawyers enforce them.
Second, it is not dear what rights ought to be
counted as part of the sphere of negative liberties.
Consider the right, found in the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, not to be compelled to be a wit-
ness against oneself. Is this a negative liberty, or an
impediment to the enforcement of the negative rights
of potential victims of crime?
Third (and related to the preceding point), some
rights straddle the line between negative and posi-
tive. The right to counsel and the right to abortion
are examples. For an affluent person, both rights are
negative: they are rights against the government's
interfering with the hiring of a lawyer and of an
abortion doctor respectively. But for a poor person,
these have to be positive liberties, because without
public assistance the poor person cannot hire a
lawyer or purchase an abortion.
Fourth, many of the costs of rights are not public
budgetary costs at all. They are such things as erro-
neous convictions and acquittals, police brutality and
other abuses of power by rights enforcers, and, above
all, private nonlegal expenditures on rights protection
and enforcement, including such mundane but cumu-
latively expensive items as locks and car alarms.3
Fifth, rights are a preoccupation mainly of
wealthy countries, in which the purely budgetary
costs of enforcing rights are not a significant factor.
Finally, there is a good deal of rights fetishism.
We romanticize rights. We-and I am speaking now
of almost the entire Western legal and political com-
munity-even sacralize them. The religious feelings
of secular moderns have been displaced onto various
aspects of "civic religion," including the protection
and enforcement of rights. Rights are treated as
Platonic forms, universalized and eternalized. They
are treated (in the famous expression of Ronald
Dworkin's) as trumps, rather than as tools of govern-
ment and hence as subject to the usual tradeoffs.
Who talks of the cost of a Platonic form?
All this said, it is pretty obvious that the benefit-
cost ratio of the public and private machinery for the
protection and enforcement of the basic negative lib-
erties is much higher than one. A suggestive although
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far from definitive statistic is that the total public
expenditures on the administration ofjustice in the
United States-expenditures on police, the courts,
prosecutors, public defenders, and prison administra-
tion-are only $61 billion a year,4 which is less than
one percent of the Gross National Product. So the
question arises: why do any countries committed to
the principle of free markets and democratic govern-
ment not have effective systems for the protection
and enforcement of the liberties that undergird a
democratic free-market system?
II. Poverty cannot be the answer, or at least the
complete answer. Few countries outside of sub-
Saharan Africa cannot afford the relative handful of
minimally honest and competent judges, lawyers,
prosecutors, and police that is necessary to operate a
legal system whose onlyjob is to protect and enforce
the fundamental rights to property, contract, and
personal safety. Two other answers are more plausi-
ble. The first is the paradox of power. A government
need not be large, but it must be strong, in order to
protect and enforce rights, but strong government is
a threat to those rights. Second, legal systems have
become encumbered with so many functions
besides the protection and enforcement of the essen-
tial negative liberties that they have become
extremely costly, and some nations cannot afford the
cost. In these nations the legal system is asked to do
too much and fails at everything, including the pro-
tection of negative liberties.
A. An effective system of property and personal
rights requires an apparatus for deterring crime, espe-
cially acquisitive crime. Not just theft, robbery,
embezzling, the forging of wills, certain types of
fraud, and other familiar acquisitive crimes, but also
bribing officials, indudingjudges, police, and officials
in charge of registering titles to real or personal prop-
erty, must be prevented, or, more precisely, must be
kept within tolerable bounds.5 It is pretty easy to
think up ways of maximizing deterrence: impose sav-
age punishments, deny procedural rights to persons
accused of crime, require citizens to carry identifica-
tion papers, pay informers generously, place judges
under the control of prosecutors (or dispense with
judges altogether), and allow the police a free hand to
use brutal methods in investigating crime. Some of
these measures might be countereffective, but as a
package modeled on military discipline culminating
in the drumhead court-martial it would be an effec-
tive method of minimizing the crime rate and thus
maximizing the protection of rights, provided that the
judges, police, and other administrators of the crimi-
nal justice system acted competently and in good
faith. That is the rub. The criminaljustice system that
I have sketched would be so powerful that it would be
a threat to negative liberties. Innocent people would
find themselves caught in police dragnets, arrested
and detained on suspicion of crime, eavesdropped and
informed on, occasionally even convicted.
To check these dangers it is necessary either to
alter the incentives of law enforcers or to create coun-
tervailing rights, or to do both-and the countervail-
ing rights may alter incentives. This process is visible
in the history of English criminal procedure in the
eighteenth century. By the beginning of that century
(in fact earlier) very severe punishments for crime
were in place, but there were no police forces, and the
right of law enforcement officers to enter a person's
home was severely limited ("a man's home is his cas-
ter). These two features of the criminal justice sys-
tem must have greatly undermined the protection of
rights yet have seemed justified by the danger of
abuse of power if the reins of the law enforcement
authorities were loosened. Early in the eighteenth
century judges were given secure tenure, emancipat-
ing them from control by the prosecutorial authority
(the king and his ministers). Yet by the end of the
century there were still no police forces and there
was still no general right to search a person's home.
At the same time there was no right of appeal by
criminal defendants and they had no right to counsel
either, so constraints on law enforcement were in
effect offset by constraints on defendants. The state
had limited power but defendants had limited rights.
Criminal proceedings were short and cheap.
The criminaljustice system of twentieth-century
America furnishes parallel illustrations. By the begin-
ning of the century there were large police forces,
which frequently abused citizens. Prison conditions
were often brutaL Indigent defendants often had no
counsel, even though criminal proceedings were
more complex than they had been in the eighteenth
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Figure 1: Homicide Rate in United States per 100,000
Inhabitants, 1933-1990
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century. The Supreme Court, beginning in the 1930s
but accelerating greatly in the 1960s, took the lead in
seeking to rectify these conditions by creating coun-
tervailing rights, including the right to exclude illegal-
ly seized evidence from a criminal trial, the right to
effective assistance of counsel in all criminal cases, the
right to invoke federal habeas corpus to obtain review
of state convictions by federal courts, and the right to
bring tort suits complaining of police brutality and
inhuman prison conditions.
The creation of these countervailing rights made
the criminal justice system cumbersome, expensive,
and probably less effective in deterring crime. As
shown in Figure l a great upsurge in crime rates accom-
panied the "Warren Court's" adventurous rulings in
criminal procedure, although the causality is deeply
uncertain,6there is some evidence that these rulings
did cause crime rates to rise.
Legislators responded by expanding pretrial
detention, authorizing more use of wiretapping and
other electronic surveillance, extending the length of
sentences, reducing judicial discretion in respect of
sentencing, hiring more educated police, increasing
the scope of pretrial prevention (that is, reducing the
right to release upon the posting of a bond), and
appropriating more money for prisons and for prose-
cution. Expanding the rights of criminal defendants,
while in one respect fostering negative liberties, in
another and possibly more important respect had
impaired them by undermining the protection of
property and personal rights that were threatened by
crime and imposing large indirect costs by making
the criminal justice system more costly.7
These points are obscured by the historical ori-
gins of the rights of criminal defendants. The people
who pressed for and obtained the rights of criminal
defendants that were recognized first in English law
and then in the American Bill of Rights were not
poor people, let alone members of the criminal class-
es. They were businessmen, publishers, writers, and
politicians. The rights they fought for were rights
that a society needs in order to make property and
political rights secure against abuse by government.
In contrast, the rights that the "Warren Court"
derived, by flexible interpretation, from the
Constitution were rights that criminals, and mem-
12 ,
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bers of an underdass or lumpenproletariat most like-
ly to be mistaken for criminals by overzealous police
or prosecutors, want or need. For the most part the
enforcement of these rights undermines property
rights and personal security by making the punish-
ment of criminals less swift and certain.
The difference is illustrated by the changing
meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the US
Constitution, one clause of which entitles criminal
defendants to the assistance of counsel. The original
understanding was that the clause entitled criminal
defendants to hire counsel if they could afford to.
Only in the twentieth century has the amendment
been understood in addition to entitle indigent
criminal defendants to the assistance of counsel fur-
nished at the government's expense. To speak with
perhaps brutal exaggeration, the twentieth century
has witnessed a shift in the legal system of the
United States from protecting the rights of the prop-
ertied to protecting the rights of the unpropertied
who covet the wealth of the propertied.
The rights that are recognized in the United
States today are not rights semper et ubique. They are
the culmination of a specific historical process and
they are relative to a specific legal and political cul-
ture, one shaped by a high level of material wealth.
They are not equally well adapted to every society.
It is not even clear-this is an especially neglected
point in discussions of civil liberties-that the ampli-
tude of criminal rights recognized in the United
States today reduces the net costs of erroneous con-
victions. There is a tug of war between the courts,
which are primarily responsible for the creation (as
by flexible interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions) of new rights,
and the legislatures. Legislatures can neutralize the
effect of a new court-created right either by reduc-
ing the funding for the defense of indigent criminal
defendants, thus making it easier to convict them,
or by increasing the severity of punishments,8 with
the consequence that even if fewer innocent people
are convicted, those that are will serve longer sen-
tences. The total suffering of the innocent will not
be reduced, unless the courts invalidate statutes that
impose severe punishments, or require generous
compensation of lawyers for indigent criminal
defendants, and American courts have been unwill-
ing to do either.
The leaders of the postcommunist societies of
Central and Eastern Europe, like the leaders of the
American Revolution, have, of course, a lively sense
of the danger of governmental oppression of the
respectable classes. That lively sense may lead to the
creation of a costly system of rights invoked primar-
ily by members of the criminal class, as has hap-
pened in the United States.
B. The other factor that I want to emphasize in the
costs of protecting and enforcing rights is the
overextension of the legal system. Suppose that at
time t a nation is communistic. Its system of law
enforcement will presumably be operating at or
near its capacity to enforce the society's existing
laws, many of which will be devoted to the enforce-
ment of positive liberties. Suppose that at time t+1
the nation converts from communism to capitalism
and it wishes to devote resources to the protection of
negative liberties, which have greater importance
in a system of free markets. Many of the old laws
will remain intact, so it will not be possible simply
to reallocate enforcement resources from positive to
negative liberties. What is more, since the transition
from communism to capitalism will often involve
an initial drop in net public revenues and an initial
increase in criminality because of the disappearance
of the police state and the greater inequality of
income and wealth in a capitalistic compared to a
communistic system, the nation may be unable to
maintain, let alone increase, the existing level of
resources devoted to law enforcement.
Reallocation will be particularly difficult for two
reasons. The first is that the benefits of effective
enforcement of negative liberties, as distinct from
positive ones, often are diffuse. This makes it diffi-
cult to marshal an effective interest group behind
the enforcement of negative liberties. Second-a
point I mentioned earlier-negative liberties are costs
as well as benefits. The rights of criminal defendants
are the clearest illustration of this point. Anything
that strengthens those rights is apt, by doing so, to
weaken the protection of property rights by reduc-
ing the expected punishment cost of theft and other
acquisitive crimes. The net benefits of a wholesale
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reallocation of enforcement resources from positive
to negative liberties may be small.
One implication of this analysis is that property
rights are cheaper to protect than other negative
liberties, and in particular the rights of criminal
defendants. Expanding the rights of those defen-
dants, or enforcing them more effectively, makes it
more costly to protect property rights, but the
reverse is not true; expanding property rights does
not make it more costly to fight crime. Another
implication is that deregulatory measures unrelat-
ed to the protection of rights-for example the
removal of price controls, or of limits on an
employer's right to fire a worker-will promote the
protection of rights by freeing up resources of the
legal system for that protection.
A further point is that the borderline between
positive and negative liberties is hazy, and not only
because of the economic links that I have stressed. In
principle, for example, antitrust laws and laws
against fraud protect free markets from distortion.
But the practice is often different. Since concepts
such as monopolization and misrepresentation (and
especially 'misleading omission") are vague, laws
aimed at preventing or punishing these practices
invite manipulation and expansion, and historically
have often been used to punish efficient practices
and express economic resentment. Antitrust laws
and laws against any but the most flagrant forms of
fraud appeared late in the development of Anglo-
American law, implying that such laws are inessen-
tial to the achievement of a high level of prosperity.
Nonwealthy countries should be cautious about
adopting expansive prohibitions against these and
other "economic" crimes, lest they deter aggressive
but efficient economic activity.
Ill. If I am correct so far that negative liberties, espe-
dally when they take the form of rights for criminal
suspects, defendants, and prisoners, may be costly
for a nation that while not poor in the way that
many African nations are poor is not wealthy the
way the United States and Germany are, we should
not be sanguine that these liberties are likely to be
placed on a secure footing in the post-communist
societies of Central and Eastern Europe any time
soon. Nor is it dear that these societies should accord
a high priority to securing all the negative liberties.
Perhaps those liberties differ greatly among them-
selves in their value to a poor society. I shall illustrate
this point with reference to the five rights focused on
during the conference.
A. The first is preventing brutal police tactics
directed against pretrial detainees. These tactics
generally center on the use of third-degree methods
to extract incriminating or otherwise useful infor-
mation (such as identifying confederates) from a
suspect before he is formally charged. This abuse,
formerly prevalent in the United States, has been
curbed by a combination of the exclusionary rule
(coerced confessions are not admissible in evi-
dence), tort remedies against the police enforceable
in federal court, the Miranda warnings, and
increased levels of police training,9 of police "pro-
fessionalism," implying good salaries. This combi-
nation would be difficult to implement in a poor
nation. A rule of evidence against coerced confes-
sions requires that judges be willing at times to
credit criminal defendants over police, since there
rarely will be evidence of coercion other than the
defendant's say-so. Even in the United States, and
even more in nations that do not have a tradition of
civil liberties and that have an inquisitorial rather
than an adversarial system of justice, judges hesi-
tate to side with lawbreakers against law enforcers.
The effectiveness of the Miranda warnings likewise
depends on the willingness ofjudges to disbelieve
police testimony. Without such willingness, the
police will not give the warnings but will merely
testify that they did. 10 The provision of tort reme-
dies against public officers implies, realistically, the
indemnifying by the state of officers found liable.
So the state must appropriate funds to compensate
criminal defendants most of whom are in fact
guilty of the crime to which they confessed, since
most coerced confessions are truthful, though this
depends in part on how much coercion is applied.
Only in the last quarter century have tort suits pro-
vided a meaningful remedy to the victim of coer-
cive interrogation in the United States.
The most effective method of reducing the role
of coercion in the interrogation of suspects may sim-
ply be to pay police officers very well. 11 That will
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enable the hiring of educated and competent police,
who being intelligent and competent will not need
to rely so heavily on coercion to obtain evidence
against suspects. And by making the job of a police-
man more valuable, a high salary will make him
more reluctant tojeopardize his job by engaging in
misconduct. But it is difficult for a nonwealthy
nation to pay its police high wages. Apart from the
financial cost, the effect is to divert a disproportion-
ate fraction of what is bound to be a smallish group
of educated and able people from other urgent
national tasks, such as entrepreneurship, adminis-
tration, medicine and public health, and defense.
Probably the greatest cost of measures to prevent
coercive interrogation is that it undermines negative
liberties at the same time that it secures them. Much
pious denial to the contrary, coercion, unless taken to
the brutal extreme at which it will induce an inno-
cent person to confess, is a cheap and effective
method of criminal investigation. It is used routinely
in situations in which the need for information is
desperate. The idea that it brutalizes the interroga-
tors and thus fosters abuses unrelated to interroga-
tion appears to be unsubstantiated. The more that
coercive interrogation is curtailed, the less secure are
property and personal rights. This is an unpleasant
tradeoff, yet any realistic regime operating in cir-
cumstances of poverty must face up to it. I abstract,
as I said at the outset, from any constraints that the
European convention on human rights may place on
the freedom of a nation that wants to belong to the
European Union to make such a tradeoff. And I
emphasize that I am speaking of the relatively mild
forms of coercion, such as protracted interrogation
and false promises of leniency, that are unlikely to
induce innocent people to confess.
B. The second right with which the conference is
concerned is the right of patients in psychiatric hos-
pitals not to be abused by the hospital staff. I take it
that "abuse" is meant to comprehend neglect, which
is the more serious problem. Instances of brutality
toward patients are not unknown. But they are less
common than in the parallel case of pretrial deten-
tion, since a hospital staff has less to gain from abus-
ing a patient than the police have to gain from beat-
ing a confession out of a suspect. The problem of
neglect is largely one of resources and so cannot be
solved simply by giving patients legally enforceable
rights, especially since an individual suffering from a
severe mental illness is an unlikely candidate to win
a lawsuit. So here is another example of the merger
of positive and negative liberties: the right to be
decently treated in a psychiatric hospital depends as
a practical matter on the allocation by society of ade-
quate resources for psychiatric facilities. But like the
rights of pretrial detainees, a right to decent treat-
ment in psychiatric hospitals is two-edged. Suppose
that a nation's budget for health care is essentially
fixed. Increasing the resources devoted to psychiatric
hospitals will reduce the resources available for
other, and possibly as or more urgent, health-care
needs. Once more a difficult tradeoff is inescapable.
A related problem, and one with a sinister reso-
nance in the formerly communist nations, is that of
improper commitment to mental institutions, or,
what is closely related, that of failure to release a com-
mitted person when he has ceased to be a danger to
himself or others. The difficulty, however, is that a
generous construal of due process, designed to prevent
improper commitment or retention, will also impede
proper commitment and retention, resulting in more
murders, other crimes, and suicides by the insane.
A similar tradeoff is required in the case of bail.
Admitting criminal suspects to bail reduces the cost of
jails and the costs to the innocent of being incarcerat-
ed mistakenly, but increases the amount of crime
since many of the people released on bail are in fact
criminals. As these examples illustrate, rights impose
costs (not all of them monetary) as well as confer ben-
efits. That, indeed, is the essential point that I make in
this paper. It is a point that economists are not likely to
ignore, but that lawyers, who reverence rights and are
not professionally sensitive to cost, are likely to ignore.
It illustrates the important role of economics in value
clarification. By showing how much some much-
desired good such as "rights" will cost in some other
desired good forgone (all that the word "cost" means
to an economist is what must be given up to obtain
something desired), the economist forces society to
decide how much it realt values the good.
I have stated this as a normative point but it also
has positive implications. The weak footing of rights
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in the ex-communist states is typically thought a
legacy of the totalitarian past. It may instead be a
matter of economics--of cost, not culture.
C. The third conference topic is the provision of
competent lawyers for defendants in criminal cases.
For affluent defendants, there should be no problem;
the market will provide competent counsel. Most
criminal defendants, however, certainly in the
United States and presumably to an even greater
degree in most other countries, are indigent. The
direct costs of providing lawyers for indigent crimi-
nal lawyers are unlikely to be high. In the United
States, Congress appropriates some S400 million a
year for retaining or employing lawyers for indigent
defendants in federal criminal cases.12 Although
only a small fraction of all criminal cases, federal
cases are disproportionately complex, with the result
that the total bill for the defense of the indigent, state
and federal, is only $14 billion a year. 13 This is little
more than S 5 per American. Granted, the figure of
$1.4 billion is an understatement. Some lawyers are
pressured by judges to "volunteer" their services to
indigent criminal defendants at below-market
rates.14 Others truly volunteer their services, but
they do so either to obtain on-the-job training or as
genuine charity, so in neither case is there a net cost
to the volunteers. Nevertheless the total costs of
defending the indigent are slight-and would be
even slighter in a country with a lower crime rate15
or with an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial
system of criminalj ustice (since lawyers play a small-
er role in an inquisitorial system)-were it not for
indirect effects of the sort that I have mentioned. A
represented defendant is more difficult to convict
than an unrepresented one, so the provision of rep-
resentation to indigent criminal defendants makes
the criminaljustice system more costly, and possibly
less effective in deterring crime.
I say possibly less efective because a system of crim-
inaljustice in which innocent persons are frequently
convicted may actually reduce the expected punish-
ment cost of crime, since that cost is net of the expect-
ed punishment cost of not engaging in crime.16 But it
is not dear that denial of an automatic right to coun-
sel in criminal cases would result in the frequent con-
viction of the innocent. When the crime rate is very
high in relation to the resources allocated for prose-
cution, prosecutors will tend to select for prosecution
only the strongest cases, and in general these will be
the cases in which the defendant is least likely to be
innocent. This selection effect will be weaker, how-
ever, in a nation that follows the German practice of
mandatory prosecution rather than the U.S. practice
of discretionary prosecution. It will also be weaker if
the nation contains a disliked minority that has a
high crime rate, such as gypsies in Hungary and
Romania. It may be easier to convict an innocent
member of that group than a guilty member of the
majority. This was a serious problem in the southern
states of the United States with respect to blacks as
late as the 1950s and was an unacknowledged motive
for the "Warren Court's" program of expanding the
rights of criminal defendants.
Notice that if criminal law and procedure were
so simplified that a person could defend himself with-
out a lawyer's assistance, and if the resources allocat-
ed to prosecution were kept down so that prosecutors
would be discouraged from pursuing (and were not
required, by a principle of mandatory prosecution, to
pursue) borderline cases, the overall costs of a crimi-
nal justice system might be extremely low yet the
risk of convicting the innocent might also be low.
An extensive literature criticizes the current
level at which the defense of indigent criminal
defendants in the United States is funded as inade-
quate, noting the low quality of much of this repre-
sentation. 17 I can confirm from my own experience
as a judge that indigent defendants are generally
rather poorly represented. But if we are to be hard-
headed we must recognize that this is not entirely a
bad thing. The lawyers who represent indigent
criminal defendants are probably good enough to
reduce the probability of convicting an innocent per-
son to a very low level. If they were much better,
either many guilty people would be acquitted or the
state would have to devote much greater resources
to the prosecution of criminal cases. Especially for a
nonweathy country (though possibly even for the
United States), a "barebones" system for the defense
of indigent criminal defendants may be optimal.
Here, though, is a complicating factor. If the law
entitles a defendant to effective assistance of counsel.
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then paying lawyers too little to attract competent
lawyers to defend indigent defendants may cost the
system more in the long run by leading to retrials fol-
lowing a determination that the defendant's lawyer
at his first trial was incompetent. But this observa-
tion is consistent with my suggestion that a non-
wealthy nation may want to set a level of compensa-
tion generous enough to induce moderately, but not
highly, competent lawyers to represent indigent
criminal defendants.
A problem with the right to counsel that is unre-
lated to subsidization is that a wealthy defendant
may be able to obtain an unjust acquittal by deploy-
ing a flock of pricey lawyers, overpowering a prose-
cutorial team that is underfunded. Poor countries
often contain a number of very wealthy people-
and have inadaquate resources for prosecution.
Several participants in the conference empha-
sized the value of a criminal defendant's or suspec-
t's lawyer as a witness to improper behavior by
police or to substandard conditions injails and pris-
ons. This value is genuine but is largely indepen-
dent of the lawyer's quality.
D. Delay in court is an old story, and a sad one; the
slogan "justice delayed is justice denied" states an
important truth. Remarkably, the enormous upsurge
in case filings in the federal courts of the United States
since 1960 has led to no increase in the court queue,18
even though the increase in the number ofjudges has
been much smaller than the increase in the number of
cases. There are three reasons why the queue has not
grown: Judges work harder; they delegate more of
their work to nonjudges, such as law derks;19 and
they have become more summary in their disposi-
tions. These adaptations, though the last two have
been widely criticized, 20 appear not to have lowered
significantly the average quality of federal judicial
output; and they may provide a model for other coun-
tries that encounter an upsurge in litigation.
A qualification is necessary, however. Court
queues are to some extent self-limiting. The longer the
queue, the greater the incentive to substitute arbitra-
tion or other nonjudicial methods of dispute resolu-
tion for the courts; there also may be greater pressure
to settle the case rather than go to trial, though this is
not certain.21 Conversely, the shorter the queue, the
greater the demand forjudicial services. The analogy
is to adding lanes to a highway in order to relieve con-
gestion. The resulting reduction in congestion will
make the highway a more attractive travel route,
drawing travelers from other roads and other modes
of transportation. The net decrease in congestion may
be slight. Similarly, a large investment in increasing
judicial capacity in order to meet surging demand
may have little effect on the court queue because the
increase in capacity will attract people from other
methods of dispute resolution into the courts.22
Ajudiciary is pretty cheap, even for a nonwealthy
nation. The federal courts of the United States are
generously funded. Federal judges are well paid (espe-
cially when their pensions are taken into account as of
course they should be), and have large offices, large
staffs, modern equipment, and tolerable although
heavy workloads. Nevertheless, at a cost of only $2.3
billion, the federal courts in 1992 handled some
320,000 civil and criminal cases (not to mention an
even larger number of bankruptcy filings),2 3 which
comes out to an average cost of less than $8000 per
case. (Of course, these are only budgetary costs; the
expense of lawyers is much more.) Court queues are
short, except for civil jury trials in some of the larger
cities; and the quality of the justice dispensed is cer-
tainly tolerable, and often distinguished.
E. The last specific right on which the conference
has focused is the protection of health by public
inspectors of restaurants and producers of food prod-
ucts. This example differs from the others in involv-
ing bureaucratic rather than judicial regulation.
Here the danger of corruption is acute, because
many inspectors are needed and they deal face-to-
face with the managers of the establishments being
inspected, which lowers the transaction costs of
bribery. There are many techniques for dealing with
the danger: Inspectors can be shifted about to avoid
developing stable relationships with the establish-
ments that they inspect. "Sting" tactics can be used to
weed out dishonest inspectors (this is commonplace
in the U.S. Postal Service). Severe punishments can
be prescribed for both giving and accepting bribes.
Standards of cleanliness can be set at minimum
rather than optimum levels, so that it is easy for the
establishments to satisfy them and therefore less
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urgent to bribe the inspectors to excuse noncompli-
ance. Generous tort remedies can be provided for
victims of food poisoning. The discretion of inspec-
tors can be minimized, since it is easier to detect the
violation of a rule than it is to detect an abuse of dis-
cretion. The sale of tainted food can be made a strict-
liability crime (as has frequently been done in the
United States), so that the seller's intent or even neg-
ligence need not be proved and his lack of evil intent
and even his due care are not defenses. Employees of
food establishments can be hired, or rewarded, as
informers. The number of restaurants and other
food producers can be limited, in order to generate
monopoly profits for them and thus increase the cost
of being forced to close by a food-poisoning ind-
dent.24 The investigation of inspectors can be placed
in a separate (and elite) agency from the inspectors
themselves, to minimize fraternizing. And as in the
case of the police, generous compensation, heavily
backloaded, of inspectors can be used to increase the
expected punishment costs of bribe-taking.
So many are the techniques for preventing the
widespread corruption of food inspectors, and so
obvious the social benefits from preventing lethal or
epidemic diseases caused by bacteria in food,25 that
failure to prevent such corruption would be difficult
to attribute to hardheaded economic tradeoffs such
as the ones I have discussed in connection with other
rights. I add that unless a society is completely disor-
ganized, a food inspector is unlikely to accept a bribe
to overlook a lethal danger, since if the danger mate-
rializes he is bound to be in very serious trouble.
We should not confine our consideration to
lethal dangers, however. As Dr. van Rijckevorsel has
emphasized in his paper for the conference,26 non-
lethal food poisoning is responsible for many days of
lost work, as well as considerable suffering, and these
costs mayjustify a substantial program of public food
inspections. At the same time, it is important to bear
in mind that if the standards to which food producers
are required to adhere are set far above what is neces-
sary to avoid serious food poisoning, corruption will
be a great, perhaps an irresistible, temptation. We
have known at least since George Orwell's Down and
Out in Paris and London that the kitchens even of dis-
tinguished restaurants are often filthy, yet without
palpable harm being done to the clientele. And recent
investigative reporting in the United States has
revealed disgustingly unsanitary conditions in the
processing of chickens, yet again seemingly with little
danger to the public health. So it is possible that min-
imum standards of cleanliness, even when they are
rather laxly enforced, in the production of food are
adequate to protect the public health. In 1983, the
most recent year for which I have the requisite data,
the total cost, state and federal of food inspection in
the United States was only about S 1 billion,27 which
again is only $4 per American; and perhaps that is
enough, though I do not know enough about the sub-
ject to express a confident opinion.
The protection of the water supply is a more
urgent task. The water supply is at once more vulner-
able and more integrated; the same water sources are
shared by far more people than share the same source
of food. But the protection of the water supply is also
much cheaper by virtue of its greater concentration.
I have mentioned corruption but the real dangers
of corruption to a nation's prosperity lie elsewhere
than in food inspection. When corruption, for exam-
ple of tax collectors, drains off public revenues-and
incidentally makes it difficult for the government to
pay tax collectors wages generous enough to discour-
age them from accepting bribes-or when essential
licenses to conduct business can be obtained only by
bribing a sequence of officials, any one of whom can
block the license, substantial macroeconomic conse-
quences are possible.28 The main solution to these
problems is lower tax rates and less government regu-
lation, which reduce the incentive to bribe public offi-
cials. The cost of this solution, political obstades to one
side, may actually be negative; reducing the size of gov-
ernment may stimulate output directly at the same
time that it does so indirectly by reducing the amount
of corruption. But that is a story for another day.
IV. I have said nothing about"culture" as a factor in the
protection or enforcement of rights, except for a glanc-
ing reference to the U.S. civil liberties tradition. No
doubt, despite my emphasis on the costs of rights, a
nation's political and legal culture affects the extent to
which rights are enforced, too. But as no one seems to
know how to alter a culture, there is not much to be
gained from dwelling on the point. This is not to say
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that cultures do not change; obviously they do. They
change with wealth; history teaches that civil liberties
are a superior good in the economist's sense, which is to
say a good the demand for which grows with income.
(This observation suggests that efforts to increase civil
liberties without regard to their costs may impair those
liberties in the long run.) My point is only that we do
know how to intervene directly to change a nation's
political or legal culture. But within the limits imposed
by a nation's existing culture there is much that can be
done-and much that should not be done-if careful
attention is paid to the economics of rights.
I have also not addressed, at least directly, the
question of the priority that the protection and
enforcement of rights should enjoy in a country that
has a desperate shortage of resources. I believe that
the protection of property rights and of basic political
rights (including the right to vote and the freedom of
the press-and both are checks on abuse of official
power) is very important, but I do not myself attach
similar importance to three of the five rights that
were the focus of the conference. Apart from the
points I made in discussing each of them, I note that
as recently as thirty years ago, these three rights (pro-
tection from police brutality in pretrial detention,
protection from custodial abuse in public psychiatric
hospitals, and provision of a competent defense attor-
ney to indigent criminal defendants) were not secure-
ly established in the United States, yet the United
States was on the whole (granted, an important qual-
ification) prosperous and free. The fourth right (rea-
sonably prompt justice) and the fifth (effective food
inspections) were securely established, and they are
both important. But they are also, I believe, feasible
even for a relatively poor country.
I am giving my personal view on the priority to
be accorded these various rights. Other people, hay-
Notes:
1 I mean in their philosophical sense. I am not
referring to the concept of "moral rights" as it is
employed in European intellectual-property laws.
2 They may be indirectly productive. Public edu-
cation, for example, may overcome the unwilling-
ness or inability of parents to invest optimally in the
human capital (earning capacity) of their children.
ing different values, may accord them a different
priority. All that is important is that they proceed in
full awareness that enforceable rights are not cost-
less, or even cheap.
A more sophisticated analysis would consider not
whether to recognize this right or that, but how
much money to spend on each one. The fact that a
right is relatively unimportant is not a good argu-
ment for spending nothing at all on it. Large social
gains might be obtainable from very modest expen-
ditures.29 I glanced at this issue in discussing the right
to assistance of counsel in a criminal case. I pointed
out that a modest level of assistance might be suffi-
dent to attract lawyers competent enough to obtain
the acquittal of the innocent, whereas a higher level
might, by attracting lawyers skillful enough to obtain
the acquittal of many guilty defendants as well, on
balance undermine rights, since criminals are rights
infringers. I glanced at the issue again when I distin-
guished between levels of coercion in interrogation.
Obviously, however, much more work must be
done before the optimal level of enforcing either
particular rights or rights in general can be pin-
pointed, whether for the United States or for the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe. This con-
ference will have served its purpose if it has helped
to launch and to guide this work.
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US, 1988 xix (Aug. 1991, NCF-125619) (tab. F)
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time in accordance with the principle of compara-
tive advantage. A corporate lawyer might find him-
self assigned to defend a criminal, even though he
had no experience in criminal law.
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